We quantify the extent to which India's success in stabilizing its wheat and rice markets affects other countries in South Asia. We deal with the variability of Indian trade and price policies by analyzing market outcomes during periods of low and high world prices; we also conduct stochastic simulations where Indian policies endogenously adjust to fluctuations in domestic and world supplies. South Asian wheat and rice markets operate near autarky, and therefore, intraregional price transmission is limited. However, we find that when India's policies result in implicit export subsidies, consumers in countries that import from India benefit; meanwhile implicit producer taxation harms consumers elsewhere. Pakistan---the only country in the region that competes with India in foreign markets---would see gains in market shares when India reduces its export subsidies. We also find that the low intra-regional trade shields India's neighbors from the excess volatility caused by Indian policies.
Introduction
India has succeeded in stabilizing its domestic wheat and rice prices relative to international prices (Srinivasan and Jha 2001; Pursell, Gulati, and Kanupriya 2007) . Such success is due to a system of policies that seeks both to increase production and reduce price volatility (Shreedhar et al. 2012; Hoda and Gulati 2013) . However, agricultural policies do not operate in a vacuum. Domestic price stabilization policies may result in lower prices, which can discourage competition from abroad (Houck 1986 ). Moreover, international trade operates as a risk sharing agreement; that is, when one country obstructs trade to reduce its own price volatility, it may further exacerbate volatility in foreign markets (e.g., Bale and Lutz 1979; Anderson and Nelgen 2012) . This paper examines the extent to which India's wheat and rice price management policies influences production, consumption, and prices in Bangladesh, Nepal, Pakistan, Sri Lanka, and an aggregate region comprising Afghanistan, Bhutan, and the Maldives. We focus on India because it is an important producer that actively operates elaborate policies to influence domestic food markets. India produces 70% of all the rice in South Asia and around a fifth of all global production. India is also the dominant wheat producer in South Asia and is the second largest producer in the world (USDA 2014) . A considerable amount of these grains (up to 35% in 2011-12) are acquired by India's government in an effort to stabilize its domestic markets (Acharya et al. 2012) . Moreover, India is committed to maintaining and expanding its food security programs (Krishnamurthy et al. 2014 ), which will likely require increasing public procurement of cereals (Sharma 2012) . Capturing the effects of India's policies is difficult because of the multiple policy instruments (for a systematic effort on separating stockholding from other policies, see Gouel, Gautam, and Martin (2014) ). We circumvent this difficulty by measuring the wedge between the domestic market prices distorted by India's food security policies and the prices that would prevail in the absence of such distortions. This task is greatly facilitated by the comprehensive assessment of agricultural price distortions in India undertaken by Pursell, Gulati, and Kanupriya et al. (2007) as part of the World Bank "Distortions to Agricultural Incentives" (DAI) ).
In addition, India's price policies rely on variable trade policies that buffer the variability of domestic and foreign supply shocks. We deal with this variability through a three-pronged strategy that includes analyzing the effects of the policy during periods of low and high world prices and then conducting stochastic simulations where the policy instruments are endogenous to fluctuations in domestic and world supplies. Finally, we explicitly model the targeted consumption subsidies under the Targeted Public Distribution System (TPDS) by keeping real Indian wheat and rice consumption prices (defined as nominal prices deflated by the wages received by unskilled Indian laborers) constant.
The effects of India's policies on other countries depend on the degree of market integration. Regional wheat and rice markets operate near autarchy, and therefore, price transmission is limited. However, we find that when India's policies result in implicit export subsidies, consumers in countries that import from India benefit -Bangladesh, in the case of wheat, and Bangladesh, Nepal, and Sri Lanka, in the case of rice. However, when India's policies result in implicit taxation, Indian export prices are higher than they would be in the absence of the policy distortions and so consumers are harmed. Opposite effects operate on the producer's side. The only country in the region that competes with India in foreign markets is Pakistan, which would see gains in market shares when India reduces its export subsidies. We also find that India's policies effectively push price instability out of its domestic markets.
However, the low trade levels in rice and wheat among South Asian nations tend to shield India's neighbors from the excess volatility caused by Indian policies.
Our work contributes to several strands of the literature. In particular, it extends and complements the work of Srinivasan and Jha (2001) , who found Indian policies destabilized world wheat and rice prices. These authors used a dynamic model driven by stochastic simulations. They examined the effects of India's policy on the domestic market and world prices, but not the regional effects on its South Asian neighbors. Our work helps in an understanding of the effects of India's policies on its South Asian neighbors, and also more broadly, the opportunities and challenges posed by greater regional integration to achieve food security (Chadha, Pratap, and Tandon 2007; Bouet and Corong 2009) . Lastly, we contribute to the literature looking at how variable trade policies in a given country influence price stability in 3 other regions (Bale and Lutz 1979; Bigman 1985; Anderson, Martin, and van der Mensbrugghe 2012) .
Background on India's food security policies
The Government of India (GOI) operates a large consumer subsidy and food distribution program that is supplied almost exclusively through domestic production. The explicit objectives of the program are to ensure "remunerative prices" to producers, provide the poor with Procurement of wheat and rice under the MSP as a percentage of production has fluctuated over the years, from around 12% in 1996-7 to about 35% in 2011-12. Some of the procured grains, between 36 and 50 million tons from 2002-03 to 2010-11 (Acharya et al. 2012, 8 ) is sold at deeply discounted prices-known as Centrally Issued Prices (CIP)-to the poor through the Targeted Public Distribution System (TPDS). Additionally, a portion of the grains 4 are distributed through welfare schemes, which include a supplementary nutrition program, midday meals for school children, food for work or employment linked programs, and other welfare programs (Acharya et al. 2012) . The CIP has been kept constant since the early 2000s, while the MSP is adjusted every season (see Sharma 2012 for a detailed historical account).
The government also actively intervenes to stabilize the grain markets by selling back to either the domestic or the international markets under the Open Market Scheme (Pursell, Gulati, and Kanupriya 2007; Acharya et al. 2012; Hoda and Gulati 2013) . Moreover, the GOI adjusts its trade policies often in order to counteract world price fluctuations and to achieve long-term price stability and food security goals (Pursell, Gulati, and Kanupriya 2007; Shikha, Srinivasan, and Landes 2007) .
The economics of India's food security policies
We start with a simple partial-equilibrium analysis of the policy instruments currently used by India to understand the relationships between the MSP and the TPDS, as well as the role of variable trade policies in defending domestic price targets. This is a helpful way to identify the policy instruments that will be employed in the numerical analysis below. To set up the stage for India's food security policies, the upper panel of Figure 1 introduces a consumer subsidy to an initial, undistorted equilibrium for the market of cereals.
[Insert Figure 1 here]
As depicted, India faces a perfectly elastic foreign excess supply curve ( ) (R ES ). In this standard setting, prices are dictated by Figure 1 assumes that India has a propensity to import-a situation that characterizes the decade of the 80s when India was a net importer of both rice and wheat (Hoda and Gulati 5 2013) . At this initial equilibrium, imports 0 m are the difference between consumption (b) and production (a).
Subsidized sales under the TPDS only target the most needy sectors of the population.
However, for the sake of simplicity, assume that the GOI desires domestic consumption to increase consumption from b to c by introducing a consumer subsidy of size s . The subsidy has the effect of enhancing the purchasing power of consumers who now can get a larger amount of the product. The subsidized price is the Centrally Issued Prices (CIP) and at these prices, the demand curve shifts to the right (to However, the GOI has a long tradition of policy interventions on the production side to boost supply and achieve food self-sufficiency. The GOI also imposes restrictions on imports to given by international prices that would prevail under undistorted 6 market conditions. However, this need not be the case-and indeed it has not been the case for prolonged periods over the last 50 years, a point that we will revisit in the next section.
At MSP prices, demand by non-government agents (i.e., households and firms that consume cereals or use them as an intermediate input) occurs at point d , which is lower than the prevailing demand under the initial undistorted equilibrium (at point b ). Meanwhile, the MSP signals producers to supply at point c which, in this simplified illustration, matches the desired consumption level established by the GOI and is well beyond the initial supply under free market conditions (at point a )
.
Under the open-ended procurement system, the resulting difference between supply and demand at market prices is absorbed entirely by the GOI, which pays producers the fixed MSP .
This action introduces a kink in the demand curve for cereals, rendering the government demand for cereals at the MSP perfectly elastic. As a consequence, market prices are forced to converge An important consequence of the introduction of the MSP is to reduce the need for imports. As illustrated in the middle panel in Figure 1 , the desired consumption level c is entirely met by domestic production, thus eliminating the need for imports. From a fiscal viewpoint, the relevant wedge between market and subsidized prices is given by f and the 7 fiscal outlay is now represented by the difference between MSP and the subsidized price CIP multiplied by the difference between the quantities sold under the public distribution system and in the open market ( c minus d ). This budget outlay labeled in the middle panel in Figure 1 as "Food Subsidy" is the accounting measure used by the GOI to track the evolution of the fiscal cost of its food security policies (Acharya et al. 2012) . Sharma (2012) indicated that in recent years, the GOI has recovered about 40% of the economic cost of the food subsidy.
In order to defend the price targets implied by the MSP, the GOI must actively fend off the price changes coming from abroad. The reason for this is illustrated in the bottom panel in 
(I ES
. In order to take the surplus off the market, the GOI can stockpile the excess supply, or sell it back in the open market, either domestic or for export. As initially drawn, with an excess demand of ) (R ED , international prices are too low relative to the MSP for India to be able to sell its excess supplies in the international market; therefore, getting rid of the excess supply would require subsidizing exports.
Alternatively, if international prices increased above the domestic price floor implied by the MSP, at any level of supply, producers would be tempted to sell their output abroad, which explains the imposition of export bans in years of high prices. Active trade policy is also a way of increasing domestic cereal availability. For example, if there is a negative supply shock in India that jeopardizes the possibility of India attending to the needs of its distribution system, the 8 GOI is likely to import from international markets to satisfy its need for additional output (e.g., Acharya et al. 2012 ).
India's food security policies and price distortions
Measuring the effects of Indian food price policies requires capturing the combined effect of the MSPs, open-ended procurement, and variable trade policies. For this we rely on the comprehensive assessment of agricultural price distortions in India undertaken by (Pursell, Gulati, and Kanupriya 2007) as part of the World Bank's "Distortions to Agricultural Incentives" (DAI) Anderson and Nelgen 2012) .
Price distortions in the DAI database are expressed as commodity-level Nominal Rates of Assistance (NRA) to producers. We focus on border NRAs, which are the percentage by which domestic producer prices exceed a counterfactual undistorted market price of an equal product at the same point of the supply chain, for example, a port of entry. Algebraically, and using the notation in Figure 1 , let PS denote domestic producer prices and P Border denote the prevailing price at the market of reference; the NRA is given by:
The term s is the ad-valorem expression of the price wedge introduced by a border measure such as an export or import subsidy (positive NRA) or tax (negative NRA). Without loss of generality, this later case corresponds to the situation depicted in the middle and lower panels of Figure 1 , where MSP is the domestic producer price and P Border is the counterfactual market price that would prevail in the absence of open-ended procurement at MSP and variable trade policies. The first, labeled "NRA estimated using parity price bands," follows the DAI methodology . These NRAs require first classifying a product as exportable, importable, or non-tradable. For importable products, the NRAs are positive when government policies protect domestic producers by boosting domestic prices above the price of competing imports. In the case of exportables, a negative NRA arises from government policies that force domestic prices to go below export parity prices, thus reducing the ability of producers to take advantage of higher export prices. When the domestic price of an importable product is below the import parity price or when the price of an exportable is above the export parity price, the NRA equals zero (non-tradables also have zero NRAs).
[Insert Figure 2004, wheat MSPs were below the import parity price and, therefore, the border NRA in the DAI database equals zero. However, that same year, India subsidized wheat exports to dispose of domestic surpluses (Pursell, Gulati, and Kanupriya 2007) , thus indirectly protecting producers.
Therefore, we present an alternative measure, labeled "NRA estimated using trade status," in which the NRA is calculated against the import parity price when the country was a net importer and against the export parity price when the country was a net exporter. When we apply thisdecision rule to Indian wheat in 2004, we obtain an alternative NRA of 17%, which effectively captures the fact that Indian exports were subsidized.
As evidenced by Figure Table A-1 and Table   A -2 in the Appendix and Anderson and Martin (2009) for a discussion of the recent evolution of 11 protection in India). The model validation strategy for the stochastic simulations relies on matching the moments of model generated and observed border NRAs. The extent to which these moments are time-invariant gives us clear fixed targets for comparison.
Empirical framework
We use a simulation model of the wheat and rice world markets focused on South Asia based on the standard version of the Global Trade Analysis Project model (Hertel 1997 ). As discussed above, India's food security policies adjust each season in order to neutralize price volatility originating either domestically or abroad. As a consequence, the opportunities for farmers in India and elsewhere to adapt to India's policy changes in a given year are limited (in agriculture, most planting decisions such as the amount of land to cultivate and type of crops to plant are irreversible, and opportunities for intra-seasonal adjustment are very limited.) We capture these rigidities by fixing labor, land, and capital in the production of paddy rice and wheat in order to match short-term supply responses. We also restrict intra-seasonal substitution between production factors and inputs. In addition, we fix the ratio of nominal rice and wheat prices deflated by the wages received by Indian unskilled laborers to capture the targeted consumption subsidies under the TDPS ( the differences between these fixed real prices and market prices are absorbed by an endogenous subsidy to Indian consumers).
We calibrate the model to the GTAP Database Version 8.1 (Narayanan, Aguiar, and
McDougall 2012), which has country-level data for Bangladesh, India, Nepal, Pakistan, Sri Lanka, and aggregated data for Afghanistan, Bhutan and the Maldives into a single region (Rest of South Asia). We also include three aggregated regions that capture non-South Asia regions, namely, NAFTA, the European Union, and the rest of the world.
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The overall strategy to measure the effects of India's price distortions on other countries consists of three experiments. In the first experiment, we explore the effects of eliminating India's policies under the conditions that characterized the first half of the 2000s when world prices were low and stable. For this experiment, we calibrate our model to the reference year 2004 of the GTAP Database Version 8.1 (Narayanan, Aguiar, and McDougall 2012) . In this year, the combination of stable domestic prices in the presence of low international prices gave rise to implicit wheat and rice export subsidies of 17% and 20%, respectively. These subsidies are close to the maximum levels of protection observed during the last 50 years. Therefore, they provide the upper bound of the effects of India's food price management policies on South Asian countries.
In the second experiment, we explore the effects of India's policies in the second half of the 2000s, a period characterized by price spikes and increased price volatility. For this analysis, we calibrate our model to the reference year 2007 of the GTAP Database 8.1. As shown in Figure 2 , the combination of stable domestic prices in the presence of rising international prices in 2007 gave rise to an implicit rice export tax of 5% and an import subsidy on wheat of 16%.
In both experiments, the border subsidies and taxes are exogenous shifters of the existing wedge between endogenously determined domestic and external prices. The elimination of the exogenous border distortion as captured by the NRAs is therefore equivalent to eliminating the gamut of food price management policies used by India such that domestic prices are forced toward the counterfactual market price that would prevail in the absence of distortions. In terms of our previous discussion, this entails setting PMS equal to P Border as in the middle panel of Figure 1 .
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The results of the two experiments provide useful information on the effects of aligning domestic and world prices within India, conditional on the particular configuration of supply and demand conditions in India and elsewhere in the considered reference years. However, both experiments miss the fact that supply shocks to agriculture are inherently random. As such, any single crop year is a unique configuration of worldwide supply and demand conditions that may not be representative of any other year in a given period of time.
The response of India to an ever-changing set of supply conditions is a constantly changing set of policies that counteract the effects of supply shocks both within the country and in the rest of the world (e.g., Pursell, Gulati, and Kanupriya 2007; Gouel, Gautam, and Martin 2014) . This is important for other countries in South Asia and the rest of the world because variable trade policies tend to push instability out of domestic markets, potentially exacerbating price instability elsewhere (Bale and Lutz 1979; Anderson and Nelgen 2012) . Therefore, in order to achieve a more complete assessment of the effects of Indian food price management policies on other South Asian countries, we conduct a third experiment to explore the degree to which India's success in stabilizing its domestic prices have resulted in more variable prices elsewhere.
For this experiment, we create an alternative model in which border taxes in India are endogenous in the sense that they adjust in response to domestic and foreign supply shocks in order to keep domestic producer prices constant. In this alternative model, the nominal rate of assistance conferred by border measures adjusts in order to keep Indian producer prices unchanged in the face of internal and external supply volatility.
Capturing such volatility involves a four-step procedure. In the first step, we estimate the joint distribution of non-systematic supply shocks (e.g., excluding technological change trends)
in the wheat and rice sectors of all the regions in the world using data for 1962 -2013 from these joint distributions, we draw a number of vectors of supply shocks (one shock for each region and crop) large enough to obtain accurate measures of model outcomes. Third, we solve the new equilibrium in the standard and alternative models (i.e., with border taxes exogenous and endogenous) implied by each vector of supply shock drawn in the previous step. In the fourth step, we calculate the means and standard deviations of the changes in prices and quantities. The comparison between the models with full price transmission (exogenous border taxes) and incomplete price transmission (endogenous border taxes) across countries and crops is a useful metric of India's price effects in the rest of South Asia.
Results

Experiment I: Response of South Asian wheat and rice markets to the elimination of
India's export subsidies
In our first experiment, we use 2004 as the reference year. This was a period of low and stable commodity prices in which implicit wheat and rice export subsidies reached 17% and 20%, respectively. By definition, export subsidies introduce a wedge between the prices received by Indian producers and the prices paid by foreign consumers. The changes in main economic outcomes resulting from eliminating these subsidies are summarized in Table 1 . In what follows, we refer to these changes using the abbreviated variable names; for example, ps are changes in supply prices.
[Insert Table 1 here]
Eliminating the implicit export subsidy on Indian wheat forces the prices received by
Indian wheat producers to fall by -9.3% (ps), while the prices of Indian wheat exports (FOB) increase by 6.2% (pfob). Such a fall in domestic wheat prices discourages domestic production and Indian wheat supply contracts by -1.6% (qo). For wheat markets to clear, the contraction in supply must be matched by contractions in aggregate wheat demand which are in turn determined by changes in demand for household consumption, as an intermediate good, and foreign demand.
Demand for household consumption (qo) remains constant since real consumption prices (relative to wages) are held constant to ensure consumers continue to be subsidized after the simulated policy overhaul. Although consumers receive the same quantity of subsidized grains, the burden of consumer subsidy on the government goes down by -10% because of the lower domestic prices. Demand for intermediate use (qfd) also remains unchanged. Therefore, the contraction in Indian wheat domestic supply is explained by changes in foreign demand, which contracts by -1.7% (qxs). Such a small change in the aggregate demand for Indian wheat contrasts with the sharp declines in bilateral export demands-which declined by 22.8% in Bangladesh, 26.4% in Sri Lanka, and 30% in the rest of South Asia (Figure 3 ). This is due to the fact that only around 6% of the wheat produced in India is exported (see sources of demand for domestic production in Table 2 ) and, therefore, the changes in foreign demand for Indian wheat are of little consequence for India's domestic market.
[Insert Figure 3 here] [Insert Table 2 here]
Moving out of India, Table 1 shows that other countries in South Asia face Indian wheat prices (pfob) 5.8% higher after the elimination of the implicit subsidies. We focus on Bangladesh because Indian wheat exports to Pakistan, Nepal, and the rest of South Asia are negligible (Table   3) . Furthermore, Sri Lanka, Nepal, and the rest of South Asia are marginal producers and consumers of wheat. In order to follow this price change as it makes its way into the decisions of wheat producers and consumers in Bangladesh, we need first to consider India's share of wheat imports in Bangladesh's total wheat import bill, which in 2004 was 39.8% (Table 2) . Such a modest share dilutes the transmission of the change in Indian FOB prices as they are transmitted into Bangladesh, so the price that Bangladeshi agents pay for wheat imports increases by just 2.8% (pim). As shown in Figure 3 , Bangladesh responds to this increment in prices by substituting extra regional imports for Indian imports.
[Insert Table 3 here]
A second crucial share filtering the transmission of price changes originating in India and transmitted to other South Asian economies is the total of domestic consumption that comes from abroad. In Table 2 , we show that imported wheat makes up 37% and 27% of total firms and household wheat consumption in Bangladesh, respectively. These import shares are high enough to transmit some of the price increase in Indian wheat to Bangladesh's economy and, therefore, both wheat producers and consumers in Bangladesh face prices 2.5% higher (ps back in Table 1 ).
The more expensive imports cause wheat users in Bangladesh to substitute imports with domestically produced wheat, which is satisfied by a slight increase in total supply of 0.4% (qs).
Finally, private consumption of wheat falls slightly (qp = -0.2%) due to the higher consumption prices.
Rice
Eliminating the rice export subsidy in India forces domestic prices to converge to international prices, which implies a reduction of 8.6% (ps). As in the case of wheat, consumption taxes adjust endogenously, so wage-deflated rice consumer prices remain constant after the export subsidies are eliminated. With decreasing market prices, the burden on the government needed to protect the subsidy to consumers decreases by 9%. For producers, the decrease in domestic prices is a disincentive that leads to a reduction in domestic rice supply by -
1.5% (qo).
As was the case in wheat, the contraction in domestic rice supply is fully explained by the contraction in foreign demand (qxs), which falls by -1.5%. Figure 3 indicates that exports from India fell across all the destinations-ranging from a contraction of about 12% to Bangladesh and Nepal, 22% in the rest of south Asia, and between 25% and 26% to the rest of the world.
Although the contractions in foreign demand appear to be substantial, most of the rice produced in India (about 93%) is consumed domestically and therefore domestic prices show little response to changes in foreign demand.
Perhaps the main contrast with the case of wheat is that transmission of Indian rice prices to South Asian neighbors is stronger because India is the main source of rice in South Asia (Table 4 ). For example, as shown by the share of India in the import bill of each country (Table   2 ), nearly 100% of rice imports to Bangladesh and Nepal originate in India. This translates to a one-to-one transmission of India's price changes such that change in Indian FOB prices and change in the price of the average rice composite (pim) are almost the same in magnitude (around 7%). However, for both Bangladesh and Nepal, the share of imported rice in domestic consumption is small. For instance, the import shares in the cost structure of firms and household consumption in Table 2 show that only 2% of total household rice consumption in Nepal originated abroad. Such a low level of imports for domestic use dilute the impacts of price increases in India. For instance, domestic prices (ps) in Bangladesh and Nepal increase only by around 2% with an almost negligible impact on supply (qo 0.2%-0.3%) and consumption (qp = 0.2%).
[Insert Table 4 here]
Unlike the case of wheat, Pakistan directly competes with India in regional rice markets.
In 2004, Pakistan supplied 25% and 76% of Sri-Lanka's and the Rest of South Asia's rice imports; moreover, Pakistan was home to around 10% of South Asian rice exports to the rest of the world (see Table 4 for figures in Million US$). As India eliminates its exports subsidies, its rice exports become less competitive. As a consequence, Pakistan gains market share in each of the markets where it competes. For example, rice exports from Pakistan to Sri Lanka increased by 15% while imports from India decreased by 13% (Figure 3 ). The increased export demand in Pakistan drives up producer prices (ps = 2.1%) and, consequently, rice production increases (qo = 0.3%). Most of this increase in rice production will go to supply increased foreign demand, while Pakistan's domestic demand for rice actually shrinks due to increased domestic prices such that rice consumption in Pakistan decreases (qp = -0.2%).
The results for Sri Lanka and the rest of South Asia highlight the competition between
India and Pakistan in the rice market. Around 70% of Sri Lanka's rice imports are sourced from India. The increase in Indian rice prices is transmitted to Sri Lanka, causing import prices (pim) to increase by 5.5%. The higher import prices translate to higher domestic supply prices, and production in Sri Lanka and the rest of South Asia go up. Sri Lanka and the rest of South Asia have relatively large shares of imports in domestic consumption (respectively, 20% and 26% ofthese countries' household consumption is sourced from abroad-see Table 2 ), which explains the relatively higher transmission (relative to Bangladesh) of price changes in India to domestic consumer prices.
Welfare
The lower panel of Table 1 shows economy-wide effects on welfare. The model results
indicate that the elimination of the export subsidies would achieve modest welfare gains in India of about $52.4 M. Most of these welfare gains come from improvement in India's terms of trade as the price of its wheat and rice exports increases faster than its import prices. There are also gains in allocative efficiency via the dismantling of the export subsidies and the reduction in subsidy burden needed to keep consumption constant. In addition to these welfare gains, eliminating the procurement system would result in additional savings because, as discussed above, administrative costs can be up to 30% of the total cost of procurement. In addition to these costs, a rationalization of procurement practices should lead to reduced costs of storage.
Bangladesh has net, albeit moderate, welfare losses due fundamentally to a deterioration of its terms of trade associated with the increased price of rice and wheat imports from India. The rest of the welfare losses, captured by changes in allocative efficiency, come from the increase in the production of subsidized wheat following higher supply prices. A similar case is observed in Sri Lanka which has a total negative change on equivalent variation, most of which is explained by the deterioration of the terms of trade due to higher price imports. The pattern repeats in the rest of South Asia, although the magnitudes are much more modest. Finally, welfare effects in 
Indian export taxes on rice and import subsidies on wheat
This second experiment represents a year of high world prices for both wheat and rice. In contrast to the previous experiment, rice exports are taxed (by 5%) while wheat imports are subsidized (by 16%). The results of eliminating these import subsidies and export taxes are summarized in Table 5 .
[Insert Table 5 here]
Wheat
Because of the very tenuous links among the wheat markets in the region and the fact that none of the countries in South Asia (except for a relatively small number of wheat exports from Pakistan) exports wheat to India, there are no effects on the wheat production or consumption of other countries in the region. However, within India, eliminating the subsidy on wheat imports increases the price of the composite wheat import (pim) by 17.5%. This translates to a large increase in the supply price (ps = 12.8%), which in turn stimulates production (qo = 1.78%).
Such an increase in production is explained by an increase in household demand for domestic wheat, which in turn acts as counterbalance for the contraction in demand from the firms sector.
The increase in domestic demand in the presence of rising prices is explained by the consumption subsidy, which increases by 11%. This prevents demand falling (qp = -0.4%), even 21 though the demand for imports contracts sharply (qim = -21.9%), mostly explained by the reduction in wheat imports from NAFTA, which was India's main supplier of wheat in 2007.
Rice
The first consequence of eliminating India's export tax is a reduction in the FOB prices at which India exports to other countries along with an increase in domestic prices. Intuitively, the removal of export taxes makes Indian rice exports more competitive abroad. Moreover, lifting the burden of the tax causes an increase in the return to farmers, who now enjoy a rise of 2.2% in their supply prices (ps). Higher supply prices are in turn associated with an increase in supply (qo = 0.6%), which in turn is entirely driven by an increase in foreign demand (qxs). (Table 7 shows that all the countries in South Asia, except for Pakistan, have increased their demand for Indian rice.) As domestic prices increase, household rice consumption is kept constant by increasing the endogenous consumption subsidy by 2%.
Outside India, all the countries see reduced import prices (pim ranging from -0.5% in the rest of SA to 2.0% in Bangladesh and Nepal), and, except for the case of Pakistan, the reduction in Indian import prices is larger than the reduction in domestic prices (ps). Therefore, and in contrast to the discussion in Experiment I, households and firms in these countries substitute away from domestic production toward India's imports, with a consequent reduction in domestic supply qo. The lower prices are associated with slightly larger consumption (qp around 0.1%).
Pakistan, on the other hand, loses market share to Indian exports, which can be verified by the reduction in the demand from abroad (qxs) and consequent supply reduction (qo) of -0.1%.
Welfare
The joint elimination of the border taxes (export taxes in rice and import subsidies in wheat) improve India's welfare through changes in allocative efficiency (in general, reducing distortions will improve the allocation of resources,) but also as a result of the improvements in its terms of trade. Except for Pakistan, the rest of the countries in South Asia have aggregated welfare gains stemming from India's elimination of its taxes on rice. The main source of these gains are improvements in the terms of trade, as India's rice prices are reduced due to the elimination of the rice export tax. However, more competitive Indian exports harm Pakistan's terms of trade, for a net welfare loss.
Experiment III: India's food price management policies and price stability in South Asia
As described above, the first step in this experiment is to characterize the distribution of the random wheat and rice yield shocks that drive supply variability in India and elsewhere. For this, we follow Valenzuela et al. (2007) and fit Autoregressive Moving Average (ARIMA) timeseries models to FAO data on annual wheat and rice yields for each region. This specification is appealing because it allows controlling for trends (e.g., technological change) as well as for other time-persistent factors by explicitly controlling for past values of yield (Greene 2008 ). In addition, ARIMA models rely on past prediction errors to arrive at a current forecast (Kennedy 2003) . Therefore, the residuals of the ARIMA models are in essence current prediction errors which we assume arise largely from weather shocks to production.
The specification takes the form:
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where t is the time period, φ and σ are parameters to be estimated, Y is the wheat or rice yields, and ε is the prediction error in a given time period. In order to determine the number of autoregressive terms (p) and number of moving average terms (q), we adopt Hyndman and Khandakar's (2008) algorithm, which returns the best ARIMA model according to Akaike's Information Criteria (AIC) after conducting a search for possible models.
Following the approach of Arndt (1996) and Pearson and Arndt (2000) , we use a symmetric triangular distribution to approximate the distribution of residuals from the singleregion regressions. The endpoints of the symmetric triangular distribution are recovered using the mean and variance of the ARIMA residuals according to the formula,
where c is an endpoint of the distribution, µ is the average yield, and V is the variance of residuals. (See Table A-3 and Table A -4 in the Appendix for the approximate triangular distributions of yields for each region.) The second step is to sample an adequate number of vectors from these distributions and solve both versions of the model (with and without India's policy) for each one of these vectors. The samples are obtained via a Gaussian quadrature procedure developed by DeVuyst and Preckel (1997) , which Arndt (1996) shows is a reasonable approximation to the Monte Carlo methods, at a fraction of the computing cost.
We then calculate the means and standard deviations for the outcome of each model. A reasonable question to formulate at this point is how well do the stylized assumptions in our model capture observed policy outcomes in India. For this, we compare the standard deviation of the simulated percentage changes in the endogenous border with the actual average and standard deviation changes in the historical NRAs (see Table A-1 and Table A -2 in the Appendix). For wheat, the standard deviation of the simulated changes in border taxes is 37%, while the standard 24 deviation of historical NRA is 33%. For rice, the standard deviation of the changes in simulated border taxes using the 2004 reference year is 27%, which matches the standard deviation of the historical NRAs. These results suggest that the model aptly captures the essence of India's inherently changing food price management and trade policies. Table 6 shows the difference in the percentage changes of mean and standard deviations between the model with full price transmission and the model in which India actively stabilizes domestic prices by using variable border taxes. Our results indicate that without active policy, wheat supply prices in India would be on average 12% higher. These results are consistent with the depressing effect of India's stabilization policies on farmer prices as documented by Pursell, Gulati, and Kanupriya (2007) . The increase in rice prices is much more modest, just 1%, suggesting that the price stabilization policies tend to have only moderate effects on price levels (Anderson and Martin 2009; Pursell, Gulati, and Kanupriya 2007) . In contrast, eliminating India's implicit export subsidies would reduce wheat and rice FOB prices by around 6 and 12 percentage points, confirming the evidence from the historical NRAs which suggests that stabilization policy in India often results in implicit export taxes (Anderson and Martin 2009). Turning to volatility, the switch from stabilizing to unobstructed price transmission policies increases the standard deviation of domestic prices of both wheat (32..3%) and rice (4.4%), reflecting the effectiveness of variable trade policies in dealing with the natural variability of prices in relation to random supply shocks.
[Insert Table 6 here]
As we move into the other economies in the region, it is helpful to write the relationship between market and export prices as: PM , . It is clear from this expression that the export price FOB will vary in inverse proportion to the export tax, which in turn absorbs the price volatility that would otherwise be shared by India and the other regions according to their trade shares and demand and supply elasticities. A main implication of this is that by seeking to stabilize the domestic market, India pushes the instability out onto its trading partners. Table 6 verifies that indeed, once India refrains from using stabilizing policies, the standard deviation of the FOB prices of Indian commodities decreases, by 17 percentage points in the case of wheat and by 25 percentage points in the case of rice. As a consequence, the standard deviation of import wheat and rice prices originating in India falls across the board for both wheat and rice (column labeled Border price in Table 6 ). However, although import prices become less volatile, wheat and rice markets in South Asia operate near autarchy, which shields the other countries in the region from India's policy-induced volatility, as evidenced by the very low change in the standard deviation of domestic prices, production, and consumption.
Conclusions
We examined the extent to which India's price management policies have affected the rice and wheat markets in neighboring South Asia countries. Our empirical strategy generated a 26 number of worthwhile insights. For instance, consumers in countries that import from India (Bangladesh in the case of wheat, and Bangladesh, Nepal, and Sri Lanka in the case of rice) benefit from the implicit export subsidies that India's policies confer on their products.
Producers, on the other hand, are harmed. When the policies result in taxation, Indian export prices are higher than they would be in the absence of distortions, and consumers in the importing countries face higher prices, which is likely to benefit producers. For Pakistan, which competes with India in both the wheat and rice markets, new market opportunities open up when India reduces export subsidies. However, Pakistan benefits from the implicit export taxation that keeps Indian rice (or wheat) out of the regional markets.
The magnitudes involved, however, are moderate. For example, in 2004 when export subsidies were among the highest in recent history, the price increases accruing to Bangladesh wheat producers after eliminating the subsidies were around 2%. An important qualification to these results is that they apply to a representative household and therefore do not shed light on the significance of a 2% increase in wheat prices for poor consumers and producers. In countries where income protection/farm stabilization projects seek to protect the poor, this is an important consideration.
Historical nominal rates of assistance show that India's policies flexibly adjust to insulate the domestic cereal markets from domestic and external shocks. This implies that one year, Indian grains are implicitly taxed, while the next year, they may be subsidized. These switching regimes make it difficult to characterize the long-run effect of the policies. Our approach was to sample the historical variation of worldwide rice and wheat yield shocks, and using stochastic simulations, compare the variability of prices with and without Indian intervention. Although India is a large producer of wheat, it is a marginal player in the global wheat market and 27 therefore its stabilization policies are of little consequence for both the region and the world. In the case of rice, our results show that by stabilizing its domestic market, India destabilizes prices in the region. However, due to the near-autarchy under which rice markets operate in South Asia, changes in India's price volatility do not have discernible effects in other South Asian regions. -11.5 -11.7 -9. For rice, these two series move in parallel, with the ADTMC for importables (ADTMCM) being, on average during 1991-2004, 79% of the ADTMC for exportables, ADTMCX (coefficient of variation 1.9 %.) In addition, during the last 20 years, these costs have been, on average, 5.6% of the landed price of importable wheat, with a coefficient variation of 19% and a range of values between 4% and 7.2%. Therefore, to update the series to 2013, we assume that these costs have been 5.6% of the landed price. -0.17 0.22 Note: NRA is calculated against the import parity price when the country was a net importer and against the export parity price when the country was a net exporter. See text for details. 
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